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Abstract
An important objective in the development of targeted therapies is to identify
the populations where the treatment under consideration has positive benefit risk
balance. We consider pivotal clinical trials, where the efficacy of a treatment is
tested in an overall population and/or in a pre-specified subpopulation. Based on a
decision theoretic framework we derive optimized trial designs by maximizing utility
functions. Features to be optimized include the sample size and the population in
∗This project has received funding from the European Union’s 7th Framework Programme for research,
technological development and demonstration under the IDEAL Grant Agreement no 602552, and
the InSPiRe Grant Agreement no 602144.
†Contributed equally.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
03
98
7v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  1
3 J
un
 20
16
which the trial is performed (the full population or the targeted subgroup only) as
well as the underlying multiple test procedure. The approach accounts for prior
knowledge of the efficacy of the drug in the considered populations using a two
dimensional prior distribution. The considered utility functions account for the
costs of the clinical trial as well as the expected benefit when demonstrating efficacy
in the different subpopulations. We model utility functions from a sponsor’s as well
as from a public health perspective, reflecting actual civil interests. Examples of
optimized trial designs obtained by numerical optimization are presented for both
perspectives.
1. Introduction
In the development of targeted therapies the investigation of potentially predictive biomark-
ers is critical. If efficacy is limited to an identifiable subgroup of patients, developing a
therapy for an unselected patient population is ethically problematic and will also require
unnecessarily large sample sizes because of a diluted treatment effect. On the other hand,
erroneously restricting a drug development program to a subpopulation is also unethical,
as it excludes patients from an effective treatment. Furthermore, it will entail a financial
loss for the sponsor because of unnecessary costs of biomarker development and screening
and the lower prevalence of the future patient population.
Several one and two stage clinical trial designs have been proposed in which the treat-
ment effect is tested in an overall population as well as in a subgroup of biomarker positive
patients (Mandrekar and Sargent, 2009; Chen and Beckman, 2009; Freidlin et al., 2010;
Mandrekar and Sargent, 2011; Freidlin et al., 2012; Ziegler et al., 2012) (see (Ondra et al.,
2016) for a recent review). To account for the resulting multiple comparisons, tailored
multiplicity adjustments have been developed (Song and Chi, 2007; Alosh and Huque,
2009; Bretz et al., 2009; Burman et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Spiessens and Debois,
2010; Bretz et al., 2011; Millen and Dmitrienko, 2011; Alosh and Huque, 2013). Alpha
allocation has also been optimized using interim trial data and/or data external to the
trial, with respect to a utility function, providing an early example of the use of decision
analysis (Chen and Beckman, 2009).
In this paper we use a comprehensive decision theoretic approach to derive optimal
trial designs for the development of targeted therapies. Especially, the framework allows
us to assess when it is favourable to investigate the biomarker in a clinical trial and when
it is actually more efficient to disregard the biomarker and to proceed with a classical trial
design. This extends earlier decision theoretic methods that focused on the selection of
the population for clinical trials incorporating a biomarker (Beckman et al., 2011; Krisam
and Kieser, 2014; Götte et al., 2015; Kirchner et al., 2016; Krisam and Kieser, 2015; Graf
et al., 2015).
Consider a setting where a single potentially predictive binary biomarker has been
identified in advance, separating the full population F into biomarker positive (S) and
biomarker negative (S ′) patients and there is prior evidence suggesting that the treatment
effect may be more pronounced (or only present) in the biomarker positive group. Let λS
and λS′ , satisfying λS + λS′ = 1, be the prevalences of biomarker positive and biomarker
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negative patients in the full population. For this situation we consider three design options
for a pivotal clinical trial: (i) The classical design that does not account for the biomarker
status and tests for a treatment effect in the full population only, (ii) the stratified design
that also recruits patients from the full population but where the biomarker status of
each patient is determined and the treatment effect is tested in the full population and
the subpopulation, and, (iii) the enrichment design, where patients are screened for the
biomarker status and only biomarker positive patients are included in the trial.
The choice of trial design will in general not only be based on power arguments, but
on the overall expected utility of different designs, accounting for the potential rewards
and costs. Rewards can be quantified by the sales revenue, from a sponsor’s view, or
by a measure of the overall health benefit, from a public health view. The costs of the
trial are determined by fixed and per patient costs as well as investments in biomarker
development and the determination of the biomarker status for the patients in the trial.
Based on a decision theoretic framework, we first optimize each of the three trial designs
by choosing optimal sample sizes (and an optimized multiple testing procedure for the
stratified design). Then, the optimal design can be selected among the three optimised
designs based on their expected utilities. The optimal design choice depends on the
type of utility function used (sponsor’s view or public health view), the reward and cost
parameters, the prior distribution on the effect sizes and the prevalence of the biomarker
positive subgroup.
2. Testing Problem and Considered Trial Designs
Let ∆ = (δS, δS′) denote the treatment effects for the primary efficacy endpoint in the
subgroup and its complement, respectively. Furthermore, let pi(∆) denote a prior dis-
tribution on ∆. We focus on priors that satisfy pi(∆) = 0 for δS < δS′ . This accounts
for settings where there is some evidence that the effect size in the biomarker positive
treatment group may be larger than in the biomarker negative group but not the other
way around.
For simplicity, we assume that the basis of marketing authorization is a single pivotal
trial. We further assume that a necessary condition for regulators to approve a drug
for the populations S or F is the demonstration of a significant treatment effect in the
respective population by a suitable multiple testing procedure controlling the familywise
error rate (FWER) at level α in the strong sense. Consider the two null hypotheses
HS : δS ≤ 0 and HF : δF ≤ 0,
where δF = λSδS + λS′δS′ , and let, for some trial design d, ψd = (ψS,d, ψF,d) denote a
multiple testing procedure such that ψi,d = 1 (0) if there is a statistically significant (no
significant) treatment effect in population i = S, F .
We consider three types of trial designs, the classical, the stratified and the enrichment
design. Let D = {Cn, Sn,αS , En|n ≥ nmin, αS ∈ [0, α]} denote the set of considered trial
designs, where Cn, Sn,αS , En are defined below:
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Classical design Cn refers to a classical parallel group design with per group sample
size n recruiting patients from the full population and testing HF only. HF is tested by
a non-stratified test ψF,Cn and we set ψS,Cn = 0.
Stratified Design Sn,αS refers to a stratified design, which differs from the classical
design in that analysis is stratified by the biomarker status and both hypotheses HF
and HS are tested with a weighted multiple testing procedure with parameter αS. As
multiple testing procedure we apply the closed Spiessens-Debois’ test (Song and Chi,
2007; Spiessens and Debois, 2010). This test combines the Spiessens-Debois’ test for the
rejection of the intersection hypothesis HS ∩ HF with the closed testing principle so as
to obtain a test for the rejection of either HS or HF (or both). Let pS and pF denote
unadjusted p-values for testing HS and HF , respectively. Here we assume that HF is
tested with a test stratified for the biomarker (in contrast to the classical design, where a
non-stratified test is used as no biomarker information is available). For αS, αF ≥ 0, the
closed Spiessens-Debois’ test then rejects HS if pS ≤ α and either pS < αS or pF < αF .
Similarly, it rejects HF if pF ≤ α and either pS < αS or pF < αF . To control the
familywise error rate at level α in the strong sense, the significance levels αS and αF need
to satisfy
PHS∩HF (pS ≤ αS ∨ pF ≤ αF ) ≤ α . (1)
Thus, the significance level αF is determined by (1) if αS ≤ α is given. Note that the
corresponding function αF (αS) depends on the subgroup prevalence λS.
We assume that in the stratified design, market authorization in the population F
is not only determined by the treatment effect in F , but that regulators additionally
require some evidence that there is a treatment effect in both S and S ′, so that the
rejection of HF is not completely dominated by a treatment effect in a single subgroup
only. Thus, we assume that the regulators’ decision rule corresponds to a hypothesis test
where HF is only rejected, if, in addition, the p-values pS and pS′ of tests for efficacy in
the two subgroups fall below corresponding thresholds τS and τS′ . The resulting modified
Spiessens-Debois’ test (ψS,Sn,αS , ψF,Sn,αS ) rejects HS if {pS ≤ α} ∧ {pS ≤ αS ∨ pF ≤ αF}
and rejects HF if {pF ≤ α} ∧ {pS ≤ αS ∨ pF ≤ αF} ∧ {pS ≤ τS ∧ pS′ ≤ τS′}. Note that
this test is strictly conservative, because the consistency thresholds τS and τS′ are not
considered in the level α condition.
Enrichment Design En refers to an enrichment design, which differs from the classical
design in that only patients from the subpopulation are recruited and only HS is tested.
In the enrichment design, HS is tested by a test denoted by ψS,En and we set ψF,En = 0.
3. Utility Functions
We define utility functions that quantify the potential rewards for each of the possible
trial outcomes as well as the cost of the trial. To model the rewards, we distinguish
between the sponsor and the public health view, leading to different utility functions for
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the two perspectives:
U (v)(d) =
∑
i=S,S′
ϕ
(v)
i,d −Cd, (2)
where v = Sponsor for the sponsor and v = Public for the public health view, d ∈ D
denotes the trial design, ϕ(v)i,d the reward due to the trial outcome in subgroup i = S, S ′
and Cd the cost of the trial. The cost functions Cd of the different trial designs d ∈ D are
sums of fixed costs and costs per recruited patient in the trial. Note that the per-group
sample size n may vary among the three designs and below we will determine optimal
sample sizes for each type of design.
For the classical design the cost function is given by
CCn = csetup + 2ncper-patient,
where the setup costs of the trial csetup are fixed costs and cper-patient are the marginal costs
per patient. In the stratified design there are additional fixed costs cbiomarker to develop
the biomarker and additional per patient costs to determine the biomarker status cscreening.
Thus, the cost function of the stratified design is given by
CSn,αS = csetup + cbiomarker + 2n(cper-patient + cscreening).
For the enrichment design the fixed costs are the same as for the stratified design. How-
ever, to recruit only biomarker positive patients one has to screen (on average) 2n/λS
patients from the full population until 2n biomarker positive patients are identified. Given
that the screening and determination of the biomarker status induces costs cscreening the
cost function is given by
CEn = csetup + cbiomarker + 2n (cper-patient + cscreening/λS) .
3.1. The Sponsor’s Utility Function
For the sponsor, the utility is the Net Present Value (NPV), which is defined as the reward
(sales revenue) minus the trial costs. We model the sponsor’s reward as a function of (i)
the outcome of the regulatory approval process, (ii) the price the sponsor can achieve,
and (iii) the size of the population the drug is licensed for.
To model (i) and (ii) we define reward functions ϕ(Sponsor)i for i = S, S ′ that specify the
reward obtained in the respective population. The reward function may depend on the
observed data, the design of the pivotal trial d and the prevalence of the subgroup. We
model the reward as the product of the price of the drug for the treatment of a single
patient times the market size. Given an overall market size N , the market sizes of the two
subgroups are λSN and λS′N , respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the payers are
willing to pay more if a larger treatment effect was observed. If the drug is authorized
for neither subgroup, both reward functions are set to zero. If the drug is authorized
for the subgroup S only, the reward for the complement S ′ is set to zero. If the drug
is authorized for the full population, we assume that the same price is charged in both
subgroups.
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We assume that (given that the respective hypothesis test rejects and the observed
effect size exceeds a clinically relevant threshold) the price increases linearly with the
observed effect size. Then the reward functions for the subgroups S and S ′ are
ϕ
(Sponsor)
S,d =
{
λS N rS ψS,d (δˆS,d − µS)+ if ψF,d = 0
λS N rF ψF,d (δˆF,d − µF )+ otherwise (3)
ϕ
(Sponsor)
S′,d = λS′ N rF ψF,d (δˆF,d − µF )+,
where µi denotes a minimal clinically relevant effect size for population i = S, F and (·)+
denotes the positive part. δˆS,d and δˆF,d are the estimates of δS and δF obtained from the
trial data. The constants ri for i = S, F are the marginal prices (the change in price if
the observed effect size increases by one unit) and N denotes the total market size, which
for the sponsor is defined as the number of future patients within the patent life of the
therapy in the unselected, full population. Note that, given that efficacy is shown in the
full population, a common treatment effect estimate δˆF is used in the price function. Then
the overall reward within the patent life of the therapy is given by ϕ(Sponsor)S,d + ϕ
(Sponsor)
S′,d .
3.2. Public health utility function
With the public health utility function we model the utility of trial designs under the
assumption that the drug is developed by public health authorities. Therefore, the utility
of a trial is given by the total health benefit to the society (adjusted by the production
cost of the drug) minus the cost of running the trial. We assume that the benefit of the
drug is measured on a monetary scale representing the expected, accumulated (over the
whole treated population) treatment effect. Costs are assumed to be the same as under
the sponsor view. The reward functions for the subgroups S and S ′ are given by
ϕ
(Public)
S,d =
{
λS N rS ψS,d (δS − µS) if ψF,d = 0
λS N rF ψF,d (δF − µF ) otherwise (4)
ϕ
(Public)
S′,d = λS′ N rF ψF,d (δF − µF ),
The first term in the utility function (2) denotes the total benefits summed over the
whole population, which are assumed to be proportional to the effect size (adjusted for a
minimal relevant threshold), if the drug is authorized. The constants ri for i = S, F are
the marginal benefits (the change in benefit if the effect size increases by one unit), and
N denotes the size of the future (unselected) patient population. Note that the benefit
depends on the actual effect sizes δi and not on the corresponding trial estimates δˆi,d,
implying that the benefit may be negative if the effect size is low. A consequence of
this model choice is that a public health authority will take into account the risk of false
positive approvals when optimizing its trial design. Such considerations are absent when
a sponsor is optimizing, since we have assumed that only the estimated effects enter its
utility function.
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3.3. Optimizing the expected utility
Recall that pi denotes a prior distribution on the effect sizes∆. For a given utility function
U (v) and set of trial designs D the design optimizing the expected utility is given by
d∗ ∈ argmaxd∈DEpi
[
U (v)(d)
]
, (5)
where
Epi[U (v)(d)] =
∫
E∆[U (v)(d)] dpi(∆), (6)
Note that the expectation is first taken over the data distribution given the effect sizes
∆ and then over the prior distribution pi.
4. Numerical Examples
We consider parallel group designs for the comparison of means of a continuous outcome.
We assume that the responses in the control and experimental treatment arms k = C, T
in subgroups j = S, S ′ are normally distributed with mean θk,j and variance σ2. However,
utilizing the central limit theorem, the model can be modified to account for many other
situations. The mean treatment effects in the two subgroups are given by δj = θT,j−θC,j.
In the classical and the enrichment design non-stratified z-tests are performed to test HF
and HS, respectively. In the stratified test, an elementary p-value pS is computed from a
z-test for HS based on the observations in S and a p-value pF from a stratified z-test for
HF stratifying by biomarker status. Then the Spiessens and Debois test is performed to
adjust for multiplicity. We set σ = 1.
To be able to compute the expected utilities by numerical integration and not to have to
rely on simulations, we approximated the sampling distributions for both the classical and
the stratified designs by normal distributions (for the enrichment design the z-test statistic
is exactly normally distributed). For the classical design, each subject recruited to the
trial belongs to S with probability λS. Therefore, each observation in group i = T,C
is with probability λS distributed as N(θi,S, σ2) and with probability λS′ distributed as
N(θi,S′ , σ2). If the biomarker is either prognostic (such that θC,S 6= θC,S′) or predictive
(such that δS 6= δS′) the overall treatment effect estimate δˆF for the classical design is
not exactly normal, but, for sufficiently large sample sizes, approximately normal by the
central limit theorem. Because the observations are drawn from a mixture distribution,
the standard deviation of δˆF increases with the absolute differences |θi,S − θi,S′ |, i = T,C.
For simplicity, in the numerical examples we assume that the biomarker is predictive only
but not prognostic (i.e., θC,S = θC,S′ , see Appendix A for further details). For the stratified
design, we assume that the subgroup estimates, δˆS and δˆS′ , are constructed as the sample
means of exactly λSn (resp. λS′n) observations per group from the subgroups S and S ′.
However, if patients are not selected for the trial based on biomarker status, the number
of subjects from each subgroup is binomially distributed, though, for large n, the random
sample sizes have only little impact and the approximation becomes accurate. Therefore,
in the numerical investigations, we introduced a minimal sample size of nmin = 50 patients
per treatment arm. For the contour plot (Figure 4) optimization was performed by
7
δS 0 δ δ δ
δS′ 0 0 δ/2 δ
”weak biomarker prior ” 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
”strong biomarker prior” 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1
Table 1: Prior distributions corresponding to scenarios where there is either only weak
or strong prior evidence that the biomarker is predictive. The constant δ > 0
parametrizes the effect sizes in the prior.
evaluating the objective function for a grid of candidate sample sizes (and αF values for
the stratified design). For the optimizations in the other plots, a further optimization
step was applied by optimizing the objective functions with the R Version 3.2.4 procedure
optim (R Core Team, 2016) using grid points as starting values.
The one-sided significance level is set to α = 0.025 and the consistency thresholds
in the multiple test for the stratified design to τS, τS′ = 0.3. We consider discrete prior
distributions piδS,i,δS′,i on a grid (δS,i, δS′,i), i = 1, . . . , l of effect sizes and specify two priors
corresponding to scenarios where there is either only weak or strong prior evidence that
the biomarker is predictive. The prior distributions used in the examples are defined in
Table 1 and depend on an effect size parameter δ. In the examples below we set δ = 0.3
with the exception of Subsection 4.1.3 where optimal designs for other choices of δ are
explored.
The reward and cost parameters in the sponsor and the public health utility function
are specified via the following three cases:
Case 1 Corresponds to a large market, where the biomarker costs are negligible, i.e.
NrS = NrF = 10,000 Million US Dollars (MUSD) per unit of efficacy and cscreening =
cbiomarker = 0.
Case 2 Corresponds to a small market, where the biomarker costs are still negligible, i.e.
NrF = NrS = 1000 MUSD per unit of efficacy.
Case 3 We add biomarker and screening costs, cscreening = 5000 USD per patient and
cbiomarker = 10 MUSD. The reward parameters NrS and NrF are the same as in
Case 2.
For all three cases we choose cper-patient = 0.05 MUSD and csetup = 1 MUSD. Note that
the setup costs are assumed to be the same for the enrichment, classical and stratified
design and therefore have no impact on the order of their expected utilities. However,
they do have an impact on the sign of the utility, and thus whether any trial design
is superior to no trial at all. In the reward functions (3,4) we set the minimal clinical
relevant thresholds to µS = µF = 0.1, which is a third of the effect size δ = 0.3 used in
the prior distributions in Section 4.1.2 and 4.1.1.
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4.1. Results
We discuss the optimal designs for the weak and the strong biomarker prior and the three
cases specifying the cost and reward parameters.
4.1.1. Optimization under the Weak Biomarker Prior
Large market, no biomarker costs (Case 1) The optimized utilities and corresponding
optimal classical, stratified and enriched designs are shown in Figure 1.
Optimal utility. For the sponsor utility function, the stratified design has the largest
expected utility, except for low prevalences where the classical design is optimal. The
latter is on first sight surprising, because in Case 1 we assume no biomarker costs. How-
ever, in the stratified design (in contrast to the classical design), to show efficacy in the
full population, we require that pS and pS′ do not exceed τS = τS′ = 0.3 (in addition to
rejection of HF in the multiple testing procedure). Thus, for low prevalences the sample
size of the stratified design needs to be substantially increased to reach a sufficient power
to show efficacy in F and therefore its expected utility is lower.
For the public health utility function we observe a similar pattern. However, for large
λS the expected utility of the classical design is almost identical to that of the stratified
design. This holds because the power to reject HS in the optimized stratified design
approaches the power to reject HF in the classical design and the rewards obtained for
authorization in populations S and F are similar. Why is the stratified design for the
sponsor view still optimal in this case? This results from the fact that the size of the
reward in the sponsor view depends on the observed rather than the true treatment
effect: for trial outcomes where HF can be rejected in the classical design but, due to
the variability of estimates, δˆS is large but δˆS′ is small (and thus δˆF < δˆS) the reward for
a market authorization in S may become larger than the reward in F . However, while
the classical design leads to rejection of HF in such cases, the stratified design rejects HS
and not HF because of the consistency threshold.
Optimal sample size. Overall, the optimized sample sizes for the public health utility
function are larger than for the sponsor utility function. They are lowest for the enrich-
ment design, and - for smaller prevalences - largest for the stratified design. For the latter,
the sample size increases sharply for low prevalences. This is due to the fact that a suffi-
cient sample size in the subgroup is required to achieve adequate power for the rejection
of both HS and HF (for the latter due to the consistency threshold τS). Furthermore,
the relationship of the optimal sample size and the prevalence is qualitatively different
for the three designs. For both utility functions the optimal sample size is increasing in
the prevalence for the enrichment design (because the gain when demonstrating efficacy
in S increases), decreasing for the stratified design (because, as noted above, a sufficient
sample size in S is required for the rejection of HS and for the rejection of HF ) and
non-monotone for the classical design (essentially because the effect size in population
F is increasing in λS such that for small λS the expected utility does not sufficiently
increase with the sample size to compensate the additional costs, while for large λS a
smaller sample size is sufficient to achieve adequate power).
Significance levels. In the intersection hypothesis test of the optimal multiple testing
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Figure 1: Weak biomarker prior and a large market with no biomarker costs (Case 1).
Optimized expected utilities and sample sizes for the enrichment, classical and
stratified design as functions of the prevalence for λS ∈ [0.05, 0.95]. For the
stratified design, optimized levels αS and αF for the multiple testing procedure
are given. The last row shows the overall probability (averaged over the prior)
that a significant treatment effect in HS or HF can be shown (and, for the
stratified design, that the thresholds τS and τS′ are crossed). The priors are
defined as in Table 1 with δ = 0.3.
10
Sponsor Public health
0
50
100
100
200
300
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
O
ptim
al utility (MUSD)
Sam
ple size
Significance le
vels
P
o
w
e
r
0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
λS
Power to reject HF / αF  Power to reject HS / αS  Power to reject HF or HS  
Stratified design  Enrichment design  Classical design  
Figure 2: Weak biomarker prior and a small market with no biomarker costs (Case 2).
See the legend of Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Strong biomarker prior and a small market with no biomarker costs (Case 2).
See the legend of Figure 1.
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procedure in the stratified design αS is larger than αF for almost all prevalences. To
make up for the lower sample sizes in the subgroup, the optimal design uses a larger αS
than αF . For increasing prevalences, the correlation of the test statistics used to test HS
and HF increases such that less multiplicity correction is required and both αS and αF
increase.
Power. We define the power corresponding to a specific trial design as the overall
probability (averaged over the prior) of regulatory approval in any population. This is
a slight generalization of the traditional concept of power, which in the current context
may be defined as the probability of regulatory approval conditional on a specific pair of
subgroup effects. The power obtained by averaging over a prior has also been referred
to as assurance (O’Hagan et al., 2005). The curves shown in Figure 1 correspond to
the optimal designs. It can be seen that the power is largest for the enrichment design,
followed by the stratified and the classical design and that it increases with the prevalence.
Note that for the stratified design, the probability to obtain marketing authorization
in HF is largest for intermediate values of λS and much lower than for the classical design
if λS is large (even though the optimized sample sizes are similar in this case). This is
due to the application of the consistency thresholds which are a more difficult to meet if
one of the subgroups S or S ′ is small.
Small market, no biomarker costs (Case 2) Case 2 differs from Case 1 only in that
the rewards NrF and NrS are reduced by a factor 10. Because of the lower rewards
the optimized expected utilities are smaller compared to Case 1 (see Figure 2 for the
expected utilities and optimized design parameters). They decrease even more than by
a factor 10 as the trial costs are not reduced proportionally. However, the optimized
sample sizes (and consequently the overall probabilities to show efficacy in the respective
populations) are substantially smaller than in Case 1. Overall, the expected utilities
follow a similar pattern as in Case 1 but the range of prevalences where the classical
design has a higher expected utility is larger than in Case 1 for both the sponsor and the
public health utility functions. The assumption of a smaller market qualitatively changes
the optimized sample size of the stratified designs as a function of the prevalence. For low
prevalences the optimized sample size is much lower than in Case 1: because the reward
is lower, it does not pay off to invest in a large overall sample size to meet the threshold
τS in the subpopulation. This is also reflected in the optimized significance levels αS and
αF , which give more weight to HF than in Case 1.
Small market with biomarker costs (Case 3) Note that the addition of biomarker
costs has no impact on the expected utility of the optimal classical design (as it does
not require the biomarker). However, the expected utilities of the enrichment and the
stratified design become smaller compared to Case 2 because of the additional costs.
Therefore, the classical design now dominates the stratified design for a broader range of
(small) values of λS and the stratified design becomes optimal only for larger values of λS
(see Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material). In the public health view, the classical
design dominates the stratified design also for very large values of λS: even though the
classical design leads to lower expected rewards compared to the stratified design (since
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the latter is more likely to lead to market authorization for too large a population), this
is compensated by the lower costs because no biomarker is required. In the sponsor view
in contrast, the difference between the expected rewards of the stratified and the classical
design is larger because it is determined by observed treatment effects (see also the
discussion of expected utilities in Case 1, where a similar pattern is observed). Therefore,
the stratified design dominates also for large values of λS.
Moreover, the biomarker costs lead to a reduction in sample size compared to Case 2.
4.1.2. Optimization under the Strong Biomarker Prior
First, note that the expected utility and optimal sample size of the enrichment design is
the same for the weak and the strong biomarker prior because the prior distribution on
the treatment effect in S is identical in both.
Large market, no biomarker costs (Case 1) For the sponsor’s utility function the
stratified design is still optimal, with the exception of very low prevalences (see Figure
S2 in the Supplementary Material). In contrast, for the public health utility function,
the enrichment and the stratified design have almost identical expected utilities unless
the prevalence is small.
Small market, no biomarker costs (Case 2) While, as in Case 1, the stratified design
is optimal for the sponsor view for all but very low prevalences, the difference between
the expected utilities of the stratified and enrichment design is small.
In contrast, for the public health utility function the enrichment design achieves the
highest expected utility (see Figure 3). Furthermore, for very low prevalences, none of
the trial designs has a positive expected utility in the public health view and the optimal
strategy is to perform no trial at all. For the sponsor view it is still optimal to perform a
trial in the unselected population, albeit with the minimal sample size if the prevalence is
small. This is due to the assumption that the NPV depends on the observed effect sizes,
which implies that the sponsor benefits from a high variability of the treatment effect
estimates.
Note that the optimal test in the stratified design gives most weight on HF for low and
on HS for large prevalences. This holds for both the public health and the sponsor utility
function.
Small market, biomarker costs (Case 3) The pattern is very similar to Case 2, how-
ever, the range of λS values where the classical (for the sponsor utility) or no trial (for
the public health utility) are optimal becomes larger (see Figure S3 in the Supplementary
Material).
4.1.3. Optimized Designs for Varying Effect Sizes
Figure 4 shows the optimal design as function of the prevalence λS and the effect size
parameter δ which parametrizes the effect sizes in the weak and strong biomarker priors
in Table 1. Under the sponsor view, either the classical or the stratified design is optimal
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Figure 4: Optimal designs for different combinations of the prevalence λS ∈ [0.05, 0.95]
and effect size parameter δ ∈ [0, 1]. Optimized utilities for the sponsor and the
public health authority are shown for both the weak and the strong biomarker
prior (as defined in Table 1) under the three different cost structures defined
by Cases 1, 2 and 3. The colour in a specific point indicate the type of the
optimal design. Grey areas correspond to regions where all optimized designs
have negative utilities, implying that the optimal choice is to perform no trial.
15
while the enrichment design never maximizes the expected utility. Surprisingly, even for
δ = 0, it is never optimal from a sponsor point of view to conduct no study at all in the
scenarios investigated. This is due to the fact that a false positive, even though unlikely,
may lead to a large reward. Therefore the optimal sample size is the minimal sample size
nmin in these scenarios. This choice minimizes the costs and maximizes the variability of
estimates.
For the public health view in contrast, for very low effect sizes, the optimal decision
is to perform no trial at all. Under the weak biomarker prior, the enrichment design is
optimal under the public health view only in the scenarios without biomarker costs, for
small δ and large enough prevalences (such that the population that will benefit from a
new treatment in the future is large enough). For larger effect sizes the classical design
is optimal for very low and very large prevalences and the stratified design otherwise.
Under the strong biomarker prior and intermediate δ, the public health utility is opti-
mized by the enrichment design (unless the prevalence is too low and the classical design
dominates). For larger δ the stratified design is optimal, again with the exception of very
low prevalences. In addition, in the scenario with biomarker costs the classical design
becomes optimal for large prevalences.
5. Discussion
The current study suggests decision-theoretic models for optimizing confirmatory biomarker
trials, both from a sponsor and a public health perspective. Furthermore, it explores the
potential discrepancies between the two perspectives.
The optimized designs depend sensitively on the particular configuration of parameter
values. Besides the priors on the effect sizes, the assumptions on the market size and
costs have a substantial impact on the optimized designs. Therefore, formulating simple
rules of thumb for trial designs is hardly feasible. However, a few general observations
can be made. The optimized sample sizes for the public health utility function are
consistently larger than for the sponsor utility (assuming the same costs, market size
and reward parameters rF , rS in both utility functions). This finding is likely due to the
fact that sponsor benefit is based on the estimate of the benefit in the trial, whereas the
public health benefit depends on the actual benefit. Thus the public health perspective
implies a higher standard for the evidence. This finding provides a quantitative basis for
the qualitative observation that health authorities tend to require a higher standard of
evidence than desired by some sponsors. Mechanism design theory could potentially be
applied to try to create mechanisms which align the incentives more completely.
Furthermore, for very low prevalences, the classical design outperforms the designs
that are based on the biomarker. However, in these scenarios the expected utility for all
designs can be negative in the public health perspective and so weakly positive in the
sponsor perspective that the sponsor would allocate its resources elsewhere as well.
We find that in the sponsor view the enrichment designs never maximize the NPV in
the considered scenarios. This is due to the fact that the sponsor may benefit from an
authorization in the larger population even if the treatment is effective in the subpop-
ulation only. For similar reasons, even under the global null hypothesis the strategy to
16
perform a trial (with minimum sample size) gives a positive NPV in the sponsor view (a
phenomenon that was observed also in other contexts (Posch and Bauer, 2013)).
In the public health view the enrichment designs are optimal for a range of scenarios.
Especially, if there is sufficient prior medical understanding that the biomarker negative
subpopulation is unlikely to be positively affected by the drug, it can be a waste of
resources to conduct the trial in this population. Ethical considerations reinforce this,
as it can be argued that genuine informed consent (Burman and Carlberg, 2010) implies
that patients should not be randomised if their expected utility is higher on standard
of care than on randomised trial medication. On the other hand, in particular when
subpopulations can be expected to be similar in efficacy, it is not always worthwhile to
conduct biomarker screening. In fact, there is an increased risk in a stratified trial that
the treatment is rejected in the biomarker negative subpopulation due to chance. Still, in
situations with genuine uncertainty about the relative efficacy in the two subpopulations,
biomarker determination and stratified designs may have a large value. An obvious
extension of our model is to allow for trial adaptations, potentially closing the biomarker
negative part of the trial at an interim, in case results are negative (Brannath et al., 2009;
Bauer et al., 2016).
When applying the presented framework to practical design decisions, the different
model components should be scrutinized. In the numerical example we have assumed for
simplicity that the biomarker is not prognostic but in practice this will often not be the
case. If the biomarker is also prognostic, the variability of the effect size estimates will
be increased with a consequent decrease in the expected utility of the classical design.
As regards the market size for the sponsor, N denotes the number of patients, deter-
mined by the patent life, for which full payment will be received upon regulatory approval.
On the other hand, for the public health authority, N denotes the total number of future
patients. In an extended model, N could be fixed to always be the total number of future
patients and a factor could be added next to N for the sponsor. This factor would then
represent the fraction of patients corresponding to the patent life, and could be made
to depend on the choice of trial design in various ways. For example, in the enrichment
design we accounted only for the screening costs arising from the determination of the
biomarker status of patients. However, if the restriction of the trial population leads to
slower recruitment and consequently a later authorization of the drug, the result will be
a reduction of the market size and the remaining patent life. This, in turn, may reduce
the potential reward in different ways for the two perspectives. Another simplification
made in our framework is the assumption of a zero discount rate for the sponsor. In
practice, a commercial sponsor would use a non-zero rate to discount future revenues,
which would lead to a further reduction of its expected utility as compared to a public
health authority.
In the considered model we assumed that the subgroup prevalences in the trial are the
same as in the total patient population. However, unless the recruitment is stratified
by subgroup, the actual prevalence in the trial will be stochastic. Furthermore, the
propensity to participate in the trial may vary between subpopulations. While our results
are generally robust to random variations in the prevalence, varying propensities for trial
participation may lead to a biased estimation of the effect size in the full population
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in the classical design (and also the stratified design, if an overall effect estimate based
on observed prevalences is computed). The question of generalizability of trial results
to general patient populations is however not specific to the development of targeted
therapies but a more general issue.
We did not explicitly incorporate a benefit risk evaluation of the treatment into the
model. However, the parameters µS and µF in the reward functions (3,4) can be inter-
preted as the minimal treatment effects that compensate the ”costs” of the treatment, as
the burden of treatment, side effects and monetary costs. While these are considered as
given in our model, they could alternatively be estimated from clinical trial data.
We modelled the sponsor and public health utility as essentially linear functions of the
observed and true effect size, respectively. From a commercial perspective this can be
reasonable for scenarios where no alternative treatment options are available. However,
if competitor products are on the market, the model may need to be modified because
the market share, in terms of number of doses prescribed, and not only the price or
benefit per patient may depend on the effect size. This can be incorporated by models
where the market share is a function of the posterior distribution of efficacy (and possibly
safety) parameters (Gittins and Pezeshk, 2000; Kikuchi et al., 2008). Another aspect of
our model for reimbursement concerns the pricing. Although NICE in the UK indicates
that they, in our situation, would accept a price proportional to net benefit, payers in
other countries may use other price models, possibly closer to a constant price. As an
alternative to our linear sales model, an aggregated commercial model could be plugged
in and similar optimization could be performed.
Finally, we note that the case of a very low prevalence, small market size and no
biomarker costs mimics the situation of a rare disease, except there is no complementary
subgroup S ′. Therefore, our results could be seen to suggest that the investigation of rare
diseases is not recommended in either perspective. Consequently, the question arises if
research in rare diseases should receive special priority and be subsidised by society such
that drug development occurs even though the expected utility to society is negative, or
in some case weakly positive but less positive than other alternative expenditures. How-
ever, this argument raises ethical questions because the purely utilitarian viewpoint that
underlies the decision theoretic framework does not account for other ethical principles
as fairness and justice. Similar issues arise for small subgroups of common diseases, an
increasing issue in cancer given the fact it being subdivided into many small molecular
subclasses. In the case of cancer, increased benefit due to matching between molecular
subgroups and targeted therapies may mollify this issue, but this remains to be seen in
individual cases, so that the ethical and public policy dilemma may still be present.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Computation of Expected Utilities
We derive the expected utilities for a given effect size ∆ for the enrichment, the classical
and the stratified design. The overall expected utilities are then obtained from (6) by
integrating over the prior distribution.
Enrichment Design For the enrichment design, ψF,En = ϕ
(Sponsor)
S′,En = 0. Thus, the utility
is given by
U (Sponsor)(En) = ϕ(Sponsor)S,En −CEn = λS N rS ψS,En (δˆS,En − µS)+ −CEn .
Integrating over the resulting truncated normal distribution, the expected utility given
∆ is given by
E∆[U (Sponsor)(En)] = λS N rS
(
(1− Φ(κ))(δS − µS) + V [δˆS,En ]1/2φ(κ)
)
−CEn ,
where φ denotes the density and Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution, V [δˆS,En ] = 2σ2/n and
κ =
[
max
(
Φ−1(1− α)V [δˆS,En ]1/2, µS
)
− δS
]
/V [δˆS,En ]1/2.
Similarly, for the public health view utility function we obtain
E∆[U (Public)(En)] = λS N rS (δS − µS)
(
1− Φ
(
Φ−1 (1− α)− δS V [δˆS,En ]−1/2
))
−CEn .
Classical Design In the classical design, ψS,Cn = 0, ϕ
(Sponsor)
S,Cn = ϕ
(Sponsor)
S′,Cn and
U (Sponsor)(Cn) = ϕ(Sponsor)S,Cn + ϕ
(Sponsor)
S′,Cn −CCn = N rF ψF,Cn (δˆF,Cn − µF )+ −CCn
If the mean response in S and S ′ differ, it follows that the observations in the ex-
perimental treatment and control group follow a mixture distribution of two normal
distributions. Therefore, the variance of δˆF,Cn in the classical design is given by
V [δˆF,Cn ] = (2σ2 + λS λS′ ((θT,S − θT,S′)2 + (θC,S − θC,S′)2))/n.
Thus, the expected utility given effect sizes ∆ for the classical design is given by
E∆[U (Sponsor)(Cn)] = N rF
(
(1− Φ(κ))(δF − µF ) + V [δˆF,Cn ]1/2φ(κ)
)
−CCn ,
where δF = λSδS + λS′δS′ and κ =
(
max(Φ−1(1− α)V [δˆF,Cn ]1/2, µF )− δF
)
/V [δˆF,Cn ]1/2.
Similarly, for the public health utility function,
E∆[U (Public)(Cn)] = N rF (δF − µF )
(
1− Φ
(
Φ−1 (1− α)− δFV [δˆF,Cn ]−1/2
))
−CCn .
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Stratified Design The utility of the stratified design is given by
U (Sponsor)(Sn,αS) = −CSn,αS +
λS N rS ψS,Sn,αS (δˆS,Sn,αS − µS)+ if ψF,Sn,αS = 0N rF ψF,Sn,αS (δˆF,Sn,αS − µF )+ otherwise.
The utility of the stratified design depends on the stratified treatment effect estimate
in the full population (in the following we shorten the notation by dropping the design
index, δˆF := δˆF,Sn,αS , δˆS := δˆS,Sn,αS , δˆS′ := δˆS′,Sn,αS , ψF := ψF,Sn,αS , ψS := ψS,Sn,αS ) which
is a weighted sum of δˆS and δˆS′ . The expected utility given the effect sizes ∆ is given by
E∆[U (Sponsor)(Sn,αS)] = N rF E∆
[
ψF
(
δˆF − µF
)+]
+λS N rS E∆
[
(1− ψF )ψS
(
δˆS − µS
)+]−CSn,αS .
and can be computed by numeric integration: Let AF (n, αS;σ, α, λS, τS, τS′ , µF ) denote
the region in R2 where ψF (δˆF (ZS, ZS′)− µF )+ > 0 and let AS (n, αS;σ, α, λS, τS, τS′ , µS)
be the region where (1 − ψF )ψS(δˆS(ZS) − µS)+ > 0, where δˆF (ZS, ZS′) is the stratified
treatment effect estimate and ZS, ZS′ the z-statistics computed from the observations in
S and S ′ respectively. Then
E∆
[
ψF
(
δˆF (zS, zS′)− µF
)+]
=
∫∫
AF
(
δˆF (zS, zS′)− µF
)
φ(zS)φ(zS′) dzS dzS′ ,
and
E∆
[
(1− ψF )ψS
(
δˆS(ZS)− µS
)+]
=
∫∫
AS
(
δˆS(zS)− µS
)
φ(zS)φ(zS′) dzS dzS′ .
The shapes of the regions AF and AS depend on the specific values of the parameters
and the design variables (αS, αF , τS, τS′ and n). However, the regions may in all cases
be described by means of a finite number of straight lines, implying that the expected
values above can be computed using standard software for numerical quadrature in two
dimensions. But since the integrands are linear in zS′ and ZS′ follows a normal distri-
bution, one-dimensional integration may be carried out analytically in the zS′-direction
before applying a numerical method. This leads to faster numerical evaluations, which is
useful when investigating how the optimal solution changes over the parameter space.
For the public health view the expected utility given ∆ may be written as
E∆[U (Public)(Sn,αS)] = N rF (δF−µF )E∆ [ψF ]+λS N rS (δS−µS)E∆ [(1− ψF )ψS]−CSn,αS .
The numerical evaluation is similar to the evaluation of the conditional expectation of
the utility of the stratified design for the sponsor’s view.
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Figure S1: Weak biomarker prior and a small market with biomarker costs (Case 3).
Optimized expected utilities and sample sizes for the enrichment, classical and
stratified design as functions of the prevalence for λS ∈ [0.05, 0.95]. For the
stratified design, optimized levels αS and αF for the multiple testing procedure
are given. The last row shows the overall probability (averaged over the prior)
that a significant treatment effect in HS or HF can be shown (and, for the
stratified design, that the thresholds τS and τS′ are crossed).
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Figure S2: Strong biomarker prior and a large market with no biomarker costs (Case 1).
See the legend of Figure S1.
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Figure S3: Strong biomarker prior and a small market with biomarker costs (Case 3). See
the legend of Figure S1.
4
